Abstract-Based on the analysis of several kinds of methods generally used to intercept network packets in different layers, a dynamic mechanism using NDIS intermediate drivers is proposed to protect web security, which can block malicious connection in real time. The mechanism is mainly composed of three components which include NDIS intermediate driver-based interception module, filter module and cooperation module. Characteristics of every component are also introduced. Then the system realization is discussed in detail. Finally, experiments results show that the system can detect attacks and intercept malicious packets effectively, and the time delay of the developed driver from intercepting to denying or passing data is small.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of computer technology, network is more and more widely used, which plays an important role in our life. While at the same time, the issues of network security are becoming increasingly serious and attract more attention, especially the World Wide Web services. Once a Web server is destroyed, the services are denied and sensitive information stored in it may be leaked and tampered. Compared with the year 2006, the number of network security incidents in 2007 increased significantly, which was reported by China Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center (CNCERT/CC). In addition, most of these attacks focused on misrepresenting web page information of domestic government agencies or key information systems, and phishing for foreign commercial organizations.
At present, the defensive ways for Web server security mainly include firewall and intrusion detection. Typically, a firewall can protect the inner network from invasion and interference when communicating with outside. While with the growing complexity of network topology, traditional firewall was exposed many of the shortcomings when using. For example, intruders can forge data to bypass the firewall or perforating through it from hidden backdoors. Furthermore, firewall is hard to prevent attacks from the inside network, and it does not have the capacity of monitoring assaults in real-time. Because of this, the ideas that firewalls are sufficient to protect security, which is believed by some people, is not realistic. Since the late 90s, intrusion detection has been a hot topic which is widely talked about in academia and industry.
Intrusion detection is the act of detecting actions that attempt to compromise the confidentiality, integrity or availability of a resource [1] . A system that performs automated intrusion detection is called an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). It can make up for the disadvantages of a firewall, and provide real-time monitoring services for network. As long as the malicious behaviors are found, appropriate protective measures may be performed. As a necessary way for protecting security, intrusion detection systems have been adopted by most organizations. An IDS can be either host-based, if it monitors system calls or logs, or network-based if it monitors the flow of network packets. Most commercial products use network traffic as data source, such as Snort [2] , NFR [3] etc. The performances of above mentioned two mechanisms are based on two aspects: data engine and detection engine. Data engine monitors the original data packets in the network, and replicates them as input for detection engine. Then detection engine analyzing, matching and judging whether an attack happens, which is based on the rules base constructed first.
Compared with detection engine, data engine is fundamental equipment which determines whether the IDS can get all raw data for detection. However, the current existing systems use the copies of obtained data as input source, which is called "bypass" detection. The original packets (without inspection yet) will still be submitted to the OS for processing. Even if some data packets are judged as illegal by detection engine, these data have already been submitted. So what we can do is just to suspend the continuation of that attack to reduce the loss.
In this paper, a dynamic mechanism using NDIS intermediate drivers is proposed for protecting web security, which can monitor and interdict malicious data. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews related work. Section 3 presents framework of the system and functionality of every entity. Section 4 describes the details of our experiments, and analysis of results. Section 5 makes some conclusions and outlines some open issues for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Most of the traditional defense mechanisms are realized by the "bypass detection" method, that is, the data gathering module have a copy of the packets in the Network Interface Card, and pass to the detection module to analysis based on the rule base. However, in this way, even if the packet is found illegal, the malicious data has already been submitted to the high-level module to process, and we can only suspend the continuous attack to reduce the losses at this time. In order to remedy this shortage, a defense mechanism which can block malicious connection in real time is needed. Currently, the techniques used to intercept packets are as follows. 1) Hook. In the application layer, hook is regularly used. In programming, a hook is a place and usually an interface provided in packaged code that allows a programmer to insert customized programming. For example, a programmer might want to provide code that analyzed how often a particular logic path was taken within a program. Or a programmer might want to insert an additional capability. Typically, hooks are provided for a stated purpose and are documented for the programmer. That is, hook technology is suitable for interception of information flow. But for some special function calls , such as string operations, news are not issued by system. Under these circumstances, such function calls can not be hooked.
2) TDI driver. When applications want to receive or send packets, they use the interfaces provided by protocol drivers. The protocol-driven system predefined a set of standard interfaces and applications to interact. For example in Windows2000/NT, IP, TCP and UDP are realized in one driver program named tcp.sys. Microsoft developed TDI to provide greater flexibility and functionality than is provided by existing interfaces (such as Winsock and NetBIOS). The TDI specification describes the set of functions and call mechanisms by which transport drivers and TDI clients communicate. The specific software requirements on both sides of the interface are provided by adherence to the TDI specification. This driver also creates several devices: DeviceRawIp, DeviceUdp, DeviceTcp, DeviceIp, and DeviceMulticast. All network data operations are done through these devices. So if we can develop a filter driver to intercept these interactive interfaces, the packets are blocked. However, the method can do nothing to bottomlayer packets such as ICMP packets.
3) Winsock2 SPI (Service Provider Interface). The Winsock Service Provider Interface is a specialized discipline of Winsock used to create providers; transport providers such as TCP/IP or IPX/SPX protocol stacks use the Winsock SPI, as do namespace providers such as the Internet's Domain Naming System (DNS). After installing the SPI program, all the Winsock requests will be sent to the above mentioned program, which continues to finish network calls. The SPI allows to develop two types of transport service providers-base and layered service providers. Base service providers implement the actual details of a transport protocol: setting up connections, transferring data, and exercising flow control and error control. Layered service providers implement only higher-level custom communication functions and rely on an existing underlying base provider for the actual data exchange with a remote endpoint. Its shortcomings are: the security level is not high and it can be bypassed easily; only SOCKET type packets can be handled, which exclude the IP layer date such as ICMP and IGMP. 4) NDIS intermediate driver. By using of NDIS intermediate driver to intercept data is a commonly used way, which can help us to handle packets with our own purpose, for example repackage, encryption, content filtering, network address translation and so on. The advantage of this way is that it can process all the input and output packets passed by NIC. Its shortcomings includes (1)Dial-Up network data can not be dealt, which is the most serious defect in practice (2) the installation of NDIS intermediate driver is more trouble than TDI client. It can not achieve the automation installation [5] .
III. NDIS INTERMEDIATE DRIVERS-BASED WEB SECURE MECHANISM
NDIS is short for the "Network Driver Interface Specification". The primary purpose of NDIS is to define a standard API for "Network Interface Cards" (NICs). The details of a NIC's hardware implementation is wrapped by a "Media Access Controller" (MAC) device driver in such a way that all NIC's for the same media (e.g., Ethernet) can be accessed using a common programming interface.
NDIS was developed by Microsoft and 3Com. Using NDIS, Windows software developers can develop protocol stacks that work with the MAC driver for any hardware manufacturer's communications adapter. By the same token, any adapter maker can write a MAC driver software that can communicate with any protocol stack program. NDIS includes a protocol manager that accepts requests from the network driver (at the transport layer) and passes these requests to the NIC (at the data link layer). So multiple NDIS-conforming network drivers can co-exist. Also, if a computer contains multiple NICs because it is connected to more than one network, NDIS can route traffic to the correct card [6] . NDIS specifies interfaces for the program that sends and receives data by constructing or extracting it from the formatted units called frame (and sometimes packet or datagram), or the program interacts directly with the NIC or other adapter hardware, which sends or receives the data on the communications line in the form of electronic signals.
NDIS defines three kinds of drivers, NDIS miniport driver, NDIS intermediate driver and NDIS protocol driver. The traffic accepted by the NIC is controlled by an NDIS Miniport Driver while various protocols, such as TCP/IP are implemented by NDIS Protocol Drivers. A single miniport may be associated with one or more protocols. This means that traffic coming into the miniport may be received in parallel by several protocol drivers. Another driver type is NDIS Intermediate Driver. Intermediate drivers sit in-between the MAC and IP layers and can control all traffic being accepted by the NIC card. In practice, intermediate drivers implement both miniport and protocol interfaces [7] . The driver of the paper is a NDIS intermediate driver which sits between the NDIS intermediate driver and NDIS protocol driver in order to monitor each packet pass through it. The paper is mainly focused on intercepting traffic and sends the information to detection module. From the figure above, the NDIS intermediate driver sits between the NDIS miniport driver and protocol drivers and in order to integrate the NDIS intermediate driver with the miniport/protocol seamless, we have to implement the interface for both miniport and intermediate driver.
The miniport interface is called a virtual miniport which does not control a physical device directly. Instead, it relies on an underlying miniport driver to deal with the actual physical device. The upper edge of the virtual miniport binds with the next-higher driver, which can be a NDIS protocol driver or another NDIS intermediate driver. Also, the lower edge of the intermediate driver protocol binds to the next lower driver which can be an NDIS miniport driver or another NDIS intermediate driver.
A. System Framework
The system is mainly composed of three components which include NDIS intermediate driver-based interception module, filter module and cooperation module (Analyzer and Firewall).
NDIS intermediate driver-based interception module runs in the kernel mode, with the main purpose of blocking and parsing all the traffic from date link layer and network layer. It also buffers the interested packets and passes to detection module for deeper analysis, and waiting for the returned results to determine the next action. Filter module examines the submitted data for malicious behaviors and returns the results to interception module. Here, we use the misuse detection method, and the detection rules are stored in the rule base. If the packet is normal, then it will be transferred to web application. Otherwise, it will be discarded. The function of filter module is intrusion detection and result feedback. Cooperation module adjusts the settings of firewall to keep the information fresh, and interaction with filter module. 
B. NDIS Intermediate Driver-based interception Module
The module lies in the kernel layer, with the purpose of intercepting all data packets communicating between data link layer and network layer. When packets are transferred to a NIC, the function PtRequestComplete was called to answer the request, and the functions PtReceive and PtReceivePacket are called to receive these packets. So we can get all the communicated packets by using above mentioned functions.
After protocol analyzing, the selected packets are buffered and wait for the detection result from filter module, which decides to pass or deny these data. For the reason that all connections to web servers are established with TCP protocol, and the default port number is 80. So the selected data are the packets whose transport layer protocol is TCP and destination port number is 80. While other packets are considered as unrelated packets, which are not harmful to web servers. The process of interception is shown in Fig.3 . 
C. Filter Module
The main purpose of filter module is to judge whether a coming packet is malicious or not. The module has two states, 0 means the filter result is normal and the packet is regular, while 1 means abnormal. Only under the circumstance of normal state, the packets can be sent to higher layer for handling, such as browsing the pages. On the contrary, illegal packets are rejected for continue communicating with server. By these ways, the security of web servers can be protected.
The intrusion detection process in filter module is executed based on the rule base built up before. If the packet matches one rule in the abnormal base, that packet will be considered as suspicious. All the rules are written with Snort format and stored in normal profile base.
Snort is an open source network intrusion prevention and detection system developed by Sourcefire. Combining the benefits of signature, protocol and anomaly-based inspection, snort is the most widely deployed intrusion prevention and detection technology worldwide [8] . Snort uses a simple, lightweight rules description language that is flexible and quite powerful. Snort rules are divided into two logical sections, the rule header and the rule options. The rule header contains the rule's action, protocol, source and destination IP addresses and netmasks, and the source and destination ports information. The rule option section contains alert messages and information on which parts of the packet should be inspected to determine if the rule action should be taken [9] . For example, a rule can be written as: alert tcp any 80 -> 192.168.1.1/24 2000 (content:"|00 01 02 03|"; msg:"malicous packet";)
The rule means that, if the packet is from some web server to one inner host, and if content data exactly matching the argument data string is contained anywhere within the packet's payload, then the msg message may be alerted.
D. Cooperation Module
When the intrusive accidents are detected by filter module, the cooperation mechanism starts immediately and generates intrusion reports, which include seven elements such as intrusion type, protocol type, source IP address, destination IP address, sour port, destination port, time. Then reports are encapsulated with XML (Extensible Markup Language) and sent to Analyzer. XML is a set of rules for encoding documents electronically with the design goals to emphasize simplicity, generality, and usability over the Internet. Message written with XML language can make the cooperation module have better scalability.
Analyzer takes the role of analyzing the report and develops response strategy for Firewall, such as denying all packets from some source IP. Analyzer has the ability of detecting distributed cooperative attacks. Taking a Doorknob attack as the example, the intruder generally tries a few common account and password combinations on each of a number of computers. These simple attacks can be remarkably successful. For instance, 2 times inaccurate loggings are taken for normal, while 30 times may be intrusive. Consider a situation that the intruder distributes the attacks into 15 hosts and each host performs 2 attempts, no malicious hosts are found. Obviously, attacking is under way, and these hosts are all intrusive. When facing these above mentioned matters, analyzer will consider all the hosts (IP addresses) involved as malicious.
Based on the strategy Analyzer sent, Firewall may adjust the access control rules. By this way, our defense mechanism is changed from passive to active. When an attack occurs, the information about this connection is recorded in the Firewall. So when similar malicious packets are coming, they will be rejected by Firewall directly, without the needs of filter module detection.
IV. SYSTEM REALIZATION

A. Development Environment and Debugging Methods
In operating system (OS) such as windows, many interfaces are opened for OS to communicate with and manage a single network adapter. The main task of our work is to achieve these interfaces. The driver we developed runs on Windows2000/XP OS, and software include SoftICE and DebugView are utilized to debug. Furthermore, a driver development kit (DDK) is also used, which is a set of programs and related files that are employed to develop a new software or hardware driver or to update an existing legacy application driver for an operating system. A DDK typically includes sample drivers, source code, a debugging utility, a compiler, testing tools, other utilities, and documentation. The DDK is varying to different OS edition.
B. Data Interception
We have set a buffer queue to buffering the traffic packets. Each element in that queue is a structure, which is designed as the following: In the structure, first two elements are flags. NewPackte is a Boolean variable to judge a new packet or not, for example a latter fragment of a long packet. DisposeResult is an unsigned integer with the purpose of declaring detection result of filter module, which can be 0,1 or 2. The state of 0 is in initial, 1 is normal, while 2 is offensive. To a IP packet, the longest size is 1500 bytes, so it is also the size of LookAheadBuffer, which is used to store the coming data. As the size of MAC frame header is fixed, so the size of HeaderBuffer is 14. Followed by HeaderBuffer are three elements, which are used when data are sent to higher level protocol. Medium, MiniportHandle, MacReceiveContext are three elements that defined in an important structure NDlS_PACKET [10] , which is described by NDIS.
By revising the definition of PtReceive function in Passthru, we can intercept and form a complete packet (not a fragment). If LookAheadBufferSize is larger than PacketSiz, the data is integral and can be buffered directly. While on the contrary if LookAheadBufferSize is smaller than PacketSiz, we need to call NdisTransferData function to get the data after LookAheadBufferSize. In addition, according to the return state to decide whether to call the PtTransferDataComplete function. The process is shown in Fig.4 .
C. Communication Mechanism
A large number of real-time data need to be interacted between the Intercept module and filter module. So how to design an effective communication mechanism is an important point. In the system, the initial realization used DeviceIoControl to communicate, but the efficiency was low. So we changed our mined to employ shared memory. First, we obtained the shared memory address through DeviceIoControl, and operated it directly. In this way, the number of system calls in decreased. For solving the problem of packet loosing occurred in the process of detection, a larger buffer is applied in the kernel with the working way of FIFO. However, if the buffer is full, packet loosing is inevitable to be happened. The process can be described as the follows. 1) Applies for memory spaces.
SystemVirtualAddress[i]=ExAllocatePoolWithTag (NonPagedPool,sizeof(PACKET_BUFFER), TAG);
2) Applies for MDL (memory descriptor list) structure. A memory descriptor list is a system-defined structure that describes a buffer by a set of physical addresses.
Mdl[i]=IoAllocateMdl(SystemVirtualAddress[i], sizeof(PACKET_BUFFER), FALSE, FALSE, NULL);
3) Receives an MDL that specifies a virtual memory buffer in nonpaged pool, and updates it to describe the underlying physical pages.
MmBuildMdlForNonPagedPool (Mdl[MemNumber] ); 4) Maps the physical pages that are described by a given MDL, and returns the starting address of the mapped pages.
UserVirtualAddress 
D. Rule Base
In the process of filtering, we need to match the malicious events on the basis of current rules. The rule format applied in the famous lightweight intrusion detection system Snort is used as our rule format, and some rules for emerging attacks are added. For example, to SQL injection, we have to find the sensitive key strings/words in the SQL requests, such as ' ,?, and, or Interception program was written in the editor. We use the tools provided by DDK driver to compile. The information displayed after successful compiling is shown Fig.6 . The sp_MScopyscript stored procedure may be executed by the 'public' role by default, so it is possible that a database user with privileges may potentially exploit this issue. The Microsoft SQL Server must be configured to function as a distributor for this issue to be exploited. Certain other conditions must be satisfied for exploitation to succeed, such as the SQL Server running in the context of a domain user. Some tools, which exploit this flaw, can upgrade the attacker's privilege form normal user to administrator. Fig.5 is an example of one successful attack using one of the tools. Starting our defense system and using the same tool for the invasion, the system can block malicious data, and the log will add the following warning message: Now we need to test the time delay of the developed driver from intercepting to denying or passing data. The experimental result is shown in table1. From the result, we can see that the differences are little between installed and uninstalled the driver when the size of coming data is not big. With the increasing of the size, the delay time is also increased, but it is still in a usable state. For example, even the packet is so big to 123MB, the time delay is just increased about 10 seconds compared to uninstalled situation.
In addition, we also test the time for filter module to detect intrusions. The test is divided into four groups, with the offset sizes are different individually. Each packet is sent 200 times in every group. Experiments show that filter module can detect packets rapidly and the time consumption is small. The results are shown in table2. VI. CONCLUSION Considering the risk levels of network accidents, attacks against web server are on the forefront. The mechanism of security protection for web services attracts more attention. In this paper, we proposed the NDIS intermediate driver-based defense mechanism to make up for previous lack of "bypass detection", which can intercept the data transfer directly after finding the malicious behavior. The mechanism is mainly composed of three components which include NDIS intermediate driver-based interception module, filter module and cooperation module. The first module is used to block and buffer all packets via the NIC, and the second module takes the role of judging whether a coming packet is malicious or not. While the third module cooperates with Firewall to set the access control list dynamically. By analyzing experiment results, the system can detect SQL injection attacks and block packets effectively. The time delay of the developed driver from intercepting to denying or passing data is also small. Although the system did some work of protocol parsing, but not enough. In the near future, we need to discuss the IP datagram reassembly and TCP stream reassembly. The proposal of this mechanism can provide strong technical support for the development of web services security products. 
